A few observations to add context (partially stolen from PPRuNe):
- Pilot Flying (PF) was the Captain, 55 yo (presumably) more experienced pilot, who only got certified to fly that type (B767) in May
- Pilot Monitoring (PM) was a 38 yo first officer, also not very experienced on B767
- PF made a number of mistakes, going too high, too fast (partially because he was descending too fast), not catching the glidescope on time
- PM was concerned that the approach/descent was abnormal but kept his mouth shut as the more experienced captain was at the controls (Edit: apparently he did speak up but PF did not acknowledge)
- PM lowered the flaps much later than required (PF orders flaps lowered and PM executes, but flaps can only be lowered when aircraft goes below certain speed) and the flaps were lowered all the way as the plane crossed the runway threshold, which likely caused plane to "float" and overshoot even further
- Plane touched down too late, and left wheel even later, which likely precluded some braking mechanisms from activating (or the PF forgot to since was busy trying to put the thing down)
- PM finally said "too fast, go around" but PF ignored him (or likely did not hear)
- In these situations PM has the right (and obligation) to take over the controls and start go around by themselves, but he didn't, presumably because the Cap was driving
- PF finally panicked and started the go around procedure, bit realized it was too late almost as the front wheel exited the runway, idled the engines and reapplied the brakes.
This is the spitting image of old pre-CRM thinking:
If I try to force the captain to go around, (or follow procedures or whatever), then i am exceeding my authority and will probably be fired. Some cultures have this sort of mentality a lot stronger than others, and it has zero place in the modern cockpit.
While a captain can pull rank, they really should only ever do it with respect to the first officer if: an inexperienced first officer is trying to insist on something dangerous or forbidden by law or policy, or if the captain fully understands an FO's concerns, is fully accounting for them, and as the person ultimately responsible for safety, has determined from experience and training that the current action is safer than alternatives, and would explain but cannot explain right now for workload/emergency status reasons.
This seems like a no win situation for the subordinate pilot. Grabbing the wheel of an aircraft while landing must have its own set of risks. We also only hear about the times when the subordinate pilot didn’t prevent a crash. Never hear about the times they were mistaken and did nothing.
A big part of the monitoring pilot's job is noticing when things have gotten too far and taking over controls. This does very much include scenarios when the pilot flying has fallen to tunnel vision, subtle incapacitation, and the continuation/sunk cost fallacy.
He doesn’t need to “grab the wheel”. Simply saying “go-around” would have been enough, it’s highly highly unlikely that the captain would have ignored that.
Yes I was wrong. Looking at the transcript that go-around call out was likely from the PF; that's where the data recorder indicates the brakes were released the throttle set to max for the go-around (and go back to braking only 4 sec later).
Still, the PM notified PF that they were going too fast many times during the approach. All warnings were ignored.
I don't think there's a law mandating it, but CRM (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management) has been used and trained by all major airlines since the 1980s. The reason is simple: it doesn't really help to have two people in the cockpit if only one of them is making all the decisions.
And all Military air forces AFAIK. The military of course also takes rank very seriously, but there was existing understanding that Mother Nature doesn't give a shit about rank and so CRM makes sense in that same practical vein.
Also, you'll see that says "Crew" not just "Cockpit". Turns out that from the cockpit of an airliner you've not always got the best possible view of the problem. If the steward who has no idea how to fly a plane insists it's the right engine that is on fire, her input is valuable, from back where she's serving customers with coffee she can see the engines, the fire is on the right, whereas you're just looking at sensor outputs and you were maybe about to turn off the left engine.
I don’t think it’s required, but my friends who do flights for remote mining operations in SE Asia use the same concepts — so it really is pretty standard for commercial flying, even down to remote private operations.
A bad bump on a commercial plane can be hundreds of thousands to millions in damage + downtime + inspection/repairs. And tens or hundreds of millions if you wreck a big plane. Companies may be evil, but most would still prefer you waste $2k in go around fuel than $200k because you decided to set it down badly or $20M+ because you drove their plane off the runway.
> Pilot Monitoring (PM) was a 38 yo first officer, also not very experienced on B767
But importantly, the first officer had almost a year more experience in the 767, which sets the stage for an almost textbook imbalance: having to speak up to someone senior to you, someone older and with more overall experience, but less direct experience in the airplane they are flying
Other comments talk about The Rehearsal Season 2, which is spot on. The FAA of course had dismissed the idea that there needed to be any special focus on training pilots to speak up, saying it's already under the umbrella of CRM (crew resource management)
> - PM was concerned that the approach/descent was abnormal but kept his mouth shut as the more experienced captain was at the controls (Edit: apparently he did speak up but PF did not acknowledge)
This was exactly what season 2 of The Rehearsal was all about. It also had one of the most jaw-dropping IRL plot twists in its last episode. I highly recommend it.
I read several years back that most of the time when an accident happens the copilot knew something wrong was happening but wasn't willing to override the cap. This is a cultural change rather than procedure.
There have been big changes over the decades on that but the counterfactual is also that you could imagine lots of crashes from confusion in the cockpit during critical times if two pilots are working towards cross-objectives or are more occupied communicating to eachother than just doing what one person said needs to happen.
One more thing worth noting is that they flew through bad weather on the approach, which led to the deviation from the glideslope. But the actual issue IMHO is not going around when they noticed that the approach was wildly unstable, or at the latest when they noticed that they were going to touch down with very little runway left.
It wasn't bad weather. Captain was going way too fast to begin with, and started descent later than needed. So he needed to catch up with the glide/descent slope by making the plane descend faster. Thus gaining even more speed. He still arrived too late (overshot the beginning of the runway), with higher speed (I think 30 kts over the limit) and not configured (flaps not down).
It was really, really, really sloppy approach. And all could have been corrected just by executing go-around literally at any point in time up to 10 sec before he did. Both pilots still would have their careers, and those 5 people would still be alive.
It's one of those situations where any one risk not occurring probably would have ended up with no excursion but all risks present at the same time made this outcome.
When there's a clear problem with culture or procedures at the company, does FAA investigate the company itself and can they suspend or revoke the license?
IANAP but it's hard to imagine that the many mistakes the Pilot Flying apparently made were related to unfamiliarity with the type. They just all seem so, so, so basic.
Having pilots fighting over the controls is not a situation anyone wants. The pilot monitoring saying go around should have caused an immediate reaction, the human factors behind why it didn't will probably feature prominently in the post-accident actions.
If any of the two pilots feel uncomfortable about the approach, they are actually drilled to just order a go-around, not politely ask and hint that they would prefer to do it like this FO did (wastes time). Ideally the pilot flying should then do it, but if they don't, the pilot monitoring can also take control (while clearly stating "my controls, going around") and do it. One major issue that I bet the NTSB will note in the final report is that both pilots were relatively new to the aircraft and to the airline, usually it's preferable to pair an inexperienced FO with more experienced captains.
(not an aviation expert, just summarizing various bits and pieces I gathered from various YouTubers over the last days)
Also not an expert, I wonder if there's some rule where a "Go around!" order has precedence over any other activity anyone in the cockpit wishes to perform.
As a passenger I had my first go around a few days ago, but we were 5km away from the runway.
I experienced my first go-around a few months ago, in an A321 that was landing in Tampa.
The clouds had been very thick for awhile. The plane was making those weird low-and-slow vibes that it makes on final approach.
We popped out of the clouds and there was a highway with cars! A huge parking lot! (An airport, too? Certainly, but I didn't really see a runway or any runway-adjacent stuff.) To my inexpert eyes, we just looked to be impossibly low for our location.
The folks in the cockpit apparently didn't like what they saw with their eyes, either. In an instant, the engines roared as they simultaneously pointed the thing upwards. My little pea brain was very impressed by the immediacy of the forces on my body as we disappeared back into the clouds after what was at most just several seconds of visibility.
Anyway, it was very clear that there was no hesitation to the go-around. However that decision was reached, it was then simply executed.
The next attempt went very smoothly about ten minutes later.
It totally does. Every approach briefing includes instructions on what they will do in the event of a missed or unstable approach. The procedure is generally full throttle, nose up, gear up, retract flaps, head in the direction briefed, and notify ATC. All automatic from memory.
When either pilot calls for a go-around, both are supposed to drop literally everything else, execute the go-around without delay or hesitation, and then pause to analyze the situation once ATC gives them a heading and altitude or holding pattern to regroup.
The only thing lost in a go-around is fuel and time.
Any sane airline will never punish a call to go-around if done so in good faith.
Including the complete failure of the FO to act assertively, order a go-around, and to take the controls when it was clear the captain was not responding appropriately.
If this had happened and the captain had fought over the controls and still caused an accident, we’d be having a very different conversation. The FO would be lauded as a hero who fought to save the lives of those on the ground.
> The pilot monitoring saying go around should have caused an immediate reaction
Is there evidence that PM ever called for a go around? I mean earlier, when it would have actually been possible, not 15 seconds before the end of the flight data recording.
From what I've heard, PM stated (repeatedly) that they were too high and/or too fast, and PF was not heard to respond.
The power dynamic in training is obviously very different during training where the instructor is pilot in command.
Making the assumption the PM could have taken control cleanly if the power dynamic was so poor that they weren't able to demand a go-around seems iffy, typical stabilised approach gates are 500ft in VMC, with an aircraft travelling 3nm a minute, 40 seconds before touchdown.
But as I said, the human factors involved will be a huge focus of the accident investigation.
My response was to your point about “fighting over the controls”, as if there would have been a tug of war on the yoke as the FO tried to wrest control of the plane from the captain which is nonsense.
If anything, it would have been yet one more opportunity to avert catastrophe and perform a go-around. Pilots are trained for this, and it makes less than zero sense for a PM to fail to take the controls from a PF who is flying unsafely over some imagined fear of a battle for control while the plane jostles around hurtling toward the ground. The PM is obligated to do this by every written regulation.
If you have never actually been behind the controls of an aircraft, please just stop trying to confidently assert things about this subject.
Wouldn't be a case of "if I fix it then there was nothing wrong"? How do you, as an inferior rank, step in to correct something that you think is going to happen? Imagine the inferior officer steps in and lands the plane, wouldn't the superior officer say well duh that's what I was doing why did you intervene? It's an interesting conundrum, I think, and may exacerbate the reaction or lack thereof..
The PM got his rating about 18 months ago. The PF only got his this past May. The PM had more overall hours, but this is looking a lot like a skills issue. He was flying an unstable approach. He wasn't configured for landing.
This pairing, considering past incidents with similar airframe vs. total hours disparity, really does look to be bad practice. You've got to acknowledge the human psychology. Part of it is probably the crazy pipeline over the past few years where people are racing to 1500 hours no matter how they log them, or they're getting on restricted certs with lower hours.
I really don't think time in this particular type is a factor. None of what I've heard or read has anything to do with familiarity with its unique systems. Everything sounds like sloppy flying. Sounds like he, the PF/PIC/Captain, started the descent late, stayed too high, didn't manage the power curve well, landed long and fast and willfully ignored his first officer. One bad decision after another where instead of properly correcting it or making the safe decision to try again he decided to plow onwards.
The training pilots go through to get type rated and to be allowed to fly by airlines is incredible. But knowledge is one thing, attitudes and behavior and truly taking safety to heart outside the sim is another. I bet this guy was slightly reckless in every model he's flown.
Another alternative is external social factors acting on the captain. Maybe he was distracted by personal issues. There again though, if you're not fit to fly that day, you call out.
Yeah, time in this type could be argued as a reason they weren’t properly configured or on a stable approach, but that is exactly why go-arounds exist. Mistakes happen, errors get made, so you go TOGA, fly a holding pattern until you get sorted, then try again. Happens at every airport every single day. No harm no foul.
That is not the reason this incident happened. This happened because the pilots continued to put it on the ground while ignoring at least a dozen clear and unambiguous indicators to abort the approach and go around.
- Pilot Flying (PF) was the Captain, 55 yo (presumably) more experienced pilot, who only got certified to fly that type (B767) in May
- Pilot Monitoring (PM) was a 38 yo first officer, also not very experienced on B767
- PF made a number of mistakes, going too high, too fast (partially because he was descending too fast), not catching the glidescope on time
- PM was concerned that the approach/descent was abnormal but kept his mouth shut as the more experienced captain was at the controls (Edit: apparently he did speak up but PF did not acknowledge)
- PM lowered the flaps much later than required (PF orders flaps lowered and PM executes, but flaps can only be lowered when aircraft goes below certain speed) and the flaps were lowered all the way as the plane crossed the runway threshold, which likely caused plane to "float" and overshoot even further
- Plane touched down too late, and left wheel even later, which likely precluded some braking mechanisms from activating (or the PF forgot to since was busy trying to put the thing down)
- PM finally said "too fast, go around" but PF ignored him (or likely did not hear)
- In these situations PM has the right (and obligation) to take over the controls and start go around by themselves, but he didn't, presumably because the Cap was driving
- PF finally panicked and started the go around procedure, bit realized it was too late almost as the front wheel exited the runway, idled the engines and reapplied the brakes.
So, yeah...