No, giving the agent access to every single command on the system is not minimalist. It is actively detrimental if you want to do more than just attended coding with the agent.

Especially with autonomous agents, it's the only way to sanity.

We might need new OS abstractions.

>A Model is not a model. It is a named model configuration: ...

Remember kids, a model is not a model.

Why use a for loop with a bound as an example instead of while loops with linked lists? He or she can prompt an LLM for a better example so laziness doesn't count as an excuse.

I'm the author of the example. I wanted to keep it as simple as possible, and this is the most common form of for loop. I was sure that HN readers would be clever enough to "map" it to whatever they have in their mind that satisfy the undecidability of the condition.

But since you're nitpicking, I haven't specified the types of i and n: i is uint8_t and n is uint32_t. Does it terminate? It depends on the value of n!

> but Turing tought us that is indeed a hard task!

Analyzing whether a bounded loop terminates is impossible, got it.

>Or it could decide to apply it by default and accept that in those cases the program does something different than what the source code says. The latter is better known as UB.

But the reason why it lets the compiler fuse the loops has nothing to do with whether the loop terminates or not. The infinite loop UB is just a way of adding more UB and then invoking non infinite loop optimization.

We don't know if A[i] aliases with the pointer that stores the address of the B array and note I mean B itself not A and B overlapping. It could also alias with the loop bound. So the first loop must run until completion simply because it could accidentally overwrite a pointer or variable that is used in the second loop.

But now that we have infinite loop UB we can ignore all of that and it's not because infinite loops themselves produce optimization potential, it's because more stuff is UB now so the compiler is allowed to break aliasing rules, which is the actual thing that was preventing the optimization. The infinite loop UB is just the permission slip.

Forget if "i<n" is decidable or not: the sense is that there will always be some loops that the compiler can't determine if it's finite or not.

Forget if A and B can alias or not: the sense is having two independent actions that can be executed in the same loop or in two consecutive loops.

Let's see... what about the following example, that replaces all a's with @ and all e's with & in a zero-terminated string s?

  for (char *p=s; *p; p++)
    if (*p=='a')
      *p='@';
  for (char *p=s; *p; p++)
    if (*p=='e')
      *p='&';

  for (char *p=s; *p; p++) {
    if (*p=='a')
      *p='@';
    if (*p=='e')
      *p='&';
  }

Computing

* Agent architecture, a blueprint for software agents and control systems

* Agent-based model, a computational model for simulating the actions and interactions of individuals

* Agentic AI, autonomous artificial intelligence that can make decisions and act on those decisions on its own

* Forté Agent, an email and Usenet news client

* Intelligent agent, an autonomous, goal-directed entity which observes and acts upon an environment

* Software agent, a piece of software that acts for a user or other program

* User agent, software that is acting on behalf of a user

What exactly are you accusing the pilots involved with the accident of? That they had some perverse incentive to die?

Nope. I wrote: "The implementation of it, however, wasn't very good"

> What exactly are you accusing the pilots involved with the accident of?

Not following the runaway stabilizer trim procedure. This is supposed to be a "memory item", meaning a checklist is not required.

There were 3 MCAS incidents:

1. crew trimmed to normal with the thumb switches, then turned off the trim system. Flew the rest of the flight, landed safely.

2. crew trimmed it back to normal at least 11 times (if I recall correctly) and never turned off the trim system. Crashed.

3. Boeing Emergency Airworthiness directive was sent to all MAX pilots. In a nutshell, it says to restore normal trim using the thumb switches then turn off the trim system. EA pilots instead turned off the trim system while the airplane was pointed down at full throttle. Crashed.

The two 737 pilots I talked to about this both asserted pilot incompetence.

Personally, I assign half the blame on Boeing and the other half on the pilots. Flying is not a joke. Not paying attention to an Emergency Airworthiness Directive is not acceptable.

It was purposefully deceptive -- Boeing management actively decided to hide its existence from pilots.

The narrative that the pilots were at fault was Boeing leadership covering their ass.

The MCAS symptoms did not match runaway trim. It's not continuous. It stops and starts.

MCAS would also re-activate with a five second delay, just long enough to confuse pilots.

More importantly, deactivating the electrical trim system would make it all too easy to enter a regime where the pilots couldn't physically recover the plane.

This is a Catch-22 scenario: Activate the electrics and be killed by MCAS, or deactivate the electrics and be killed by physics.

I could go through each of your comments in this thread and point out how NTSB crash investigators proved that Boeing was directly or indirectly at fault in almost every aspect, but I don't want to write out ten pages. Others have done so already, more eloquently, and often with more colourful language. Most professional pilots were rightly furious with Boeing.

Boeing's arguments have been mutually exclusive with each other: "Just remember how to operate MCAS... which we hid from you!" and "Just disable the electric trim... which will pit you against forces you can't overcome"... "Which is not a problem because you can turn electric trim back one... but then MCAS will try to kill you again"... "It won't do that because it is dual redundant... an option... that nobody purchased... and we didn't even tell most customers about."

I expect this kind of self-contradictory "logic" from narcissists and sociopaths -- I know one of each and I'm now intimately familiar with the self serving arguments that make no sense, especially in combination.

I'll pick this one. I've heard it before. Runaway trim is uncommanded movement. It does not have to be continuous, it can stop and start. That behavior can certainly happen with a short circuit or faulty wiring. It's like the speaker connections on my home stereo - the connectors corrode over time, and the sound cuts in an out randomly.

The MCAS behavior absolutely presents as runaway trim behavior. Remember I worked for 3 years on the 757 stab trim system. I know what runaway trim is.

> deactivating the electrical trim system would make it all too easy to enter a regime where the pilots couldn't physically recover the plane.

That's why the instructions provided to the pilots said to use the thumb switches first to restore normal trim. All three crews had managed to do just that to restore normal trim. The second instance the pilots restored it ELEVEN TIMES and it never occurred to them to then turn off the trim system.

You might want to review the first incident. The MCAS system came on 2 or 3 times, and each time the crew used the thumb switches to restore normal trim. Then they turned off the trim system. The flight continued and they landed safely. They knew nothing about MCAS - they just followed the runaway stab trim procedure.

> I expect this kind of self-contradictory "logic" from narcissists and sociopaths

Being nasty doesn't lend credibility to your arguments.

Just claiming, you know.

But we can separate the financial inanity of his empire from the question, which is whether Elon is a capable engineering mind or simply an ‘Isaacson puff piece recipient’.

You can slice up arrays in O(1).

The default type is incredibly clear to me.